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Resumo 
Estados tendem a diferir em termos de provisão de bens públicos e corrupção. Por que alguns governos 
estaduais são capazes de prover saúde educação de maneira adequada enquanto outros especializam na 
provisão  de  bens  privados  tais  como  cargos  públicos  e  transferências  clientelísticas.  Neste  trabalho 
exploramos a idéia que instituições políticas são importantes determinantes das políticas implementadas 
nos estados através de um modelo do processo de formulação de políticas que é subsequentemente testado 
com dados a nível de estado para o período 1999-2006. O foco dos testes empíricos está no impacto da 
competição política e dos freios e contrapesos nas características das políticas que emergem nos estados. 
Competição  política  e  freios  e  contrapesos  têm  importantes  efeitos  virtuosos  sobre  as  escolhas  dos 
governadores e de outros atores políticos ao determinar seu horizonte no poder, o que podem fazer no 
poder e a qual custo. Nós desenvolvemos um índice de freios e contrapesos para os estados brasileiros e 
testamos a interação deste com competição política. Os resultados mostram que o impacto de competição 
política varia com o grau de freios e contrapesos. 
 
Abstract 
States usually differ markedly in terms of public goods provision and corruption. Why are some state 
governments able to provide adequate health and education services, but others tend to specialize in the 
provision  of  private  goods  such  as  public  sector  jobs  and  targeted  transfers  to  specific  clienteles? 
Exploring the idea that political institutions are important determinants of the policies implemented in 
states, we propose a model of the policymaking process and then test its implications with state-level data 
for the period 1999 to 2006 in Brazil. The focus of the empirical tests is on the impact of political 
competition and checks & balances on the characteristics of the policies that emerge in the states. Political 
competition has important virtuous effects on the choices made by governors and other political actors by 
determining how long they expect to be in power, what they can do while in power, and at what costs. We 
develop an index of checks & balances for Brazilian states and test the interaction of checks & balances 
with political competition. We found that the impact of political competition varies with the degree of 
checks & balances.  
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The Predatory or Virtuous Choices Governors Make: 
The Roles of Checks and Balances and Political Competition 
 
I.  Introduction 
The main objective of this paper is to understand the conditions leading to predatory or 
virtuous public policies. Brazil is our laboratory and is ideal because of the variation in socio-
economic conditions across the states yet still under the umbrella of the Brazilian federation, 
which controls for many macro level institutional determinants. The focus of the research is on 
the determinants of the perceived wide variation in policy outcomes across the Brazilian states. 
We are particularly interested in corruption and the provision of public goods.  
Broadly  speaking,  Brazilian  states  exhibit  great  similarity  with  respect  to  their  macro  level 
institutional  features  which  are  established  in  state  constitutions.  Politicians  in  both  the 
legislative and executive branches are elected every four years under proportional representation, 
with open lists for the former and plurality with a runoff for the latter. Legislators have no term-
limit. Governors are allowed to run for re-election just once and are very powerful at the state 
level, equipped with several institutional tools to govern. The decision-making process within 
state  legislatures  is  very  centralized  with  an  extremely  weak  and  unprofessional  committee 
system. In fact, legislative bodies are mostly reactive to executive dominance. The state courts 
are formally independent and in some cases work as an important constraint to the executive’s 
preferences. Every state possesses audit courts that oversee the execution of budgets. Even with 
these great similarities in terms of their institutional endowments, the twenty-seven Brazilian 
states are very distinct with regard to their economic and policy outcomes.  
Given the same macro state institutional endowments, what are the determinants of the different 
policy outcomes? We recognize that other economic aspects such as the stock of investment, 
level of economic integration with other states and with the international market, and foreign 
investment play important roles in economic and political outcomes. However, we would like to 
stress that micro institutional aspects related to the state politics and policymaking play key roles 
in explaining different economic and political performance at the state-level in Brazil. These 
include political competition, margin of victory of incumbents over rivals, electoral volatility, 
durability of the elite group in power, coalition size, and pork barrel allocations. We claim that 
these factors have a decisive impact on the propensity of politicians to engage in the production 
of  public  goods.  We  also  investigate  the  intertemporal  dimension  of  politicians’  choices.  
Governors with short political horizons – as opposed to dominant governors that control a state 
for several terms - will have fewer incentives to provide public goods and promote economic 
development.  Dominant  governors,  in  turn,  will  have  incentives  to  promote  economic 
development because they feel they will benefit privately from an expanding pool of resources in 
their states. This is key to explaining the puzzle posed by the existence of governors, in weakly 
institutionalized  states,  that  engage  in  predation  while  others  promote  welfare  enhancing 
measures and public goods. 
In the next section we provide a review of the literature and position our contribution. In 
Section III, we present an intuitive and formal description of our model. In Section IV we present 
our empirical results highlighting the roles of checks and balances, and political competition.  
Finally,  in  the  conclusion  we  sum  up  the  findings  and  discuss  their  implications  for  future 
research.  
II.  The determinants of public goods provision 
In the last decade or so, our theoretical understanding of the institutional determinants of 
good governance and the attending problem of corruption has expanded greatly (Persson and 
Tabellini 2000; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Besley 2006; Treisman 2007). The bottom line of   2 
this literature is that good governance involves to a large extent the ability to provide public 
goods. In recent contributions the traditional socio-economic focus on the factors shaping the 
demand for private goods’ provisions gave way to the study of the incentives politicians have to 
engage in the provision of private goods. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) have developed an 
ambitious research program aimed at explaining the choice of public goods, private goods and 
personal wealth, potentially applicable to a great number of political settings, both democratic 
and non-democratic. This research program investigates  the “circumstances under which leaders 
realize personal gain, promote public benefits and create special benefits for their political allies 
...(t)he degree to which they choose to emphasize one form of benefit over another is shown to 
depend on the selection institutions under which they operate.” The authors find that the size of 
the governing coalition is critical to the choice of public goods over private goods and self-
benefits.   
Research on the institutional determinants of the provision of public and private goods in 
developed and developing countries is burgeoning, but most of the existing empirical studies 
focus  on  the  national  level.    A  small  but  growing  number  of  contributions,  however,  have 
explored the issue at the sub-national level. In this strand of the literature scholars have examined 
the determinants of the provision of public and private goods across states (Besley, Persson, and 
Sturm. 2005; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Remmer 2007; Stokes 2005; Magaloni 2002; Chibber and 
Noorudin 2004). These contributions generally focus on a single factor or on a small number of 
social and institutional explanatory factors to determine public spending, e.g., ideology, ethnic 
fractionalization, type of party systems, and credible commitment. Alesina and Roubini (1999) 
explored the role of ideological factors in public goods provision. In turn, Alesina et al. (2003) 
argue  that  ethnic  fractionalization  and  social  heterogeneity  encourage  the  targeting  of 
particularistic  goods  to  ethnic  groups  while  discouraging  the  provision  of  public  goods.  A 
contrasting  argument  is  provided  in  Chibber  and  Noorudin  (2004)  who  found  evidence 
supporting Persson and Tabellini (2000) who claimed that proportional representation leads to 
less  public  goods  provision.  Chibber  and  Noorudin  (2004)  argue  that  states  with  two-party 
competition  provide  more  public  goods  than  states  with  multiparty  competition,  reflecting 
contrasting mobilization strategies. In two-party systems, political parties require support from 
many social groups and therefore provide public goods to win elections. In multiparty systems, 
needing only a plurality of votes to win, parties use club, rather than public, goods to mobilize 
smaller segments of the population. 
The role of parties is also emphasized in other contributions Keefer and Vlaicu (2007) 
and Robinson and Torvik (2005) emphasize the role of parties, but their focus is on credibility 
and  political  market  imperfections.  Keefer  and  Vlaicu  (2007)  propose  a  model  of  electoral 
competition
 where candidates have two costly means to make them credible: spending resources 
to communicate directly with voters and exploiting pre-existing patron-client networks. In their 
model the costs of building credibility are endogenous and lead to higher targeted transfers and 
corruption and lower public good provision.  
Attributing problems regarding the under provision of public goods to patronage politics 
is largely tautological - by definition patronage politics promotes selective incentives over the 
delivery of public goods by discouraging direct appeals to voters that are essential for credible 
mass-based  political  parties  (Keefer  2005;  Remmer  2007).    Remmer  (2007)  and  Calvo  and 
Murillo  (2004)  focus  on  the  political  incentives  influencing  the  ability  and  willingness  of 
politicians to target public sector allocations to political supporters (see also Alesina, Bakir and 
Easterly 1999). Political parties diversify their resources, investing in private, club, and public 
goods for redistribution depending on the different constituencies they target (Magaloni, Diaz-
Cayeros and Estevez 2002). Calvo and Murillo (2004) explore a model that considers both the   3 
demand side (the varying dependence on public sector resources across constituencies) and the 
supply side of patronage (where they uncover a partisan bias), and explain why some incumbents 
are  more  likely  to  benefit  from  pork.  The  use  of  particularistic  transfers  to  buy  support  is 
widespread in many countries but may look puzzling because if the secret ballot hides voters’ 
actions  from  patrons,  voters  are  able  to  renege,  accepting  benefits  and  then  voting  as  they 
choose. However, as argued by Stokes (2005) political machines use their deep insertion into 
voters’ social networks to try to circumvent the secret ballot and infer votes. 
Our approach to the study of public goods provision draws on the lessons from existing 
literature  but  incorporates  a  larger  set  of  institutional  and  political  factors  (including  their 
interaction). In addition we build on the insights from the literature on checks & balances. We 
use  an  extended  notion  of  checks  &  balances  by  including  the  media,  public  prosecutors, 
independent  regulatory  agencies  and  audit  courts  as  checks  on  the  spending  of  governors.  
Several contributors have showed how governments’ influence over the media affects corruption 
Adserá, Boix, and Page (2003); Brunetti and Weder, ( 2003); Djankov (2003); and (Besley and 
Prat (2006) present evidence that the control of the media by the government affects corruption. 
In our model we test for the control of the media by the governor as a determinant of public 
spending. Regarding the role for checks and balances there is a large theoretical and empirical 
literature  supporting  the  view  that  the  separation  of  powers  improves  the  on  quality  of 
government at the national and state level (Persson, Roland and Tabellini 2002; Alt and Lassen 
2003;  Alt  and  Lassen  2008).  As  additional  checks  on  the  choices  of  governors  we  include 
judicial and quasi-judicial institutions. Rather than examining each actor or political institution in 
isolation we look at the relevant interaction of the institutional players in order to better capture 
the policymaking process across Brazilian states. By doing so, we incorporate a broader range of 
players  and  embed  them  in  models  of  strategic interactions.  This “new  separation  of  power 
approach” (De Figueiredo, Jacobi, and Weingast 2006) allows us to study interlinked phenomena 
occurring in multiple institutions.  
III.  Institutions, players and powers 
III  a.  To  motivate  our  formal  model,  we  provide  an  intuitive  discussion  of  our 
hypotheses. The key variables are the level or “robustness” of checks & balances and the level of 
political contestability in a state. By institutionalization we mean essentially the robustness of 
checks & balances. High institutionalized political environments are typically states that have 
effective  regulatory  institutions,  autonomous  and  independent  courts  of  accounts,  state 
assemblies with professional staff and active commissions, a functional bureaucracy, a proactive 
public  prosecutor’s  office  as  well  as  other  oversight  and  deliberative  institutions  such  as 
councils. By contestability we mean political competition. Low or non-contestable environments 
are characterized by control wielded by elites in states. Typically, in Brazil, Governors exercise 
some or a great deal of control over the media, and over candidate selection at the state level.  
Table 1 shows the possible combination of these variables and the likely outcomes. In the upper 
right cell, low contestability co-exists with weak checks & balances. Because contestability is 
low, and political elites dominate the political space, the political elites may have long policy 
horizons. However, in these circumstances there are incentives for entrepreneurialism in the state 
and  for  the  creation  of  a  professionalized  bureaucracy  and  fiscal  austerity.  Governors  are 
encouraged to engage in the production of public goods that produce results in the long run. 
However because of the weak checks and balance institutions there would also be incentives for 
elites to engage in private goods provision and to appropriate public resources for private use.   
In the upper left cell, there is a combination of high contestability and weak checks & balances. 
In this case there are strong incentives for the provision of private goods and corruption, because   4 
elites have a short time horizon. Low levels of checks & balances provide the ideal setting for 
predatory practices, particularly if the level of contestability is high. We expect low incentives 
for the supply of public goods and consequently poor developmental outcomes. 
The bottom row represents cases of high levels of checks & balances. High levels of checks & 
balances  create  incentives  for  the  supply  of  public  goods,  but  its  interaction  with  levels  of 
contestability may produce divergent outcomes. Low contestability may create incentives for 
clientelism,  which  is  mitigated  by  strong  checks  on  the  executive.  In  turn,  high  levels  of 
contestability may create policy volatility in case there is strong adversarial political tradition in 
the state. This is the case when good projects are discontinued because of preference polarization 
or predatory practices adopted by the elites to differentiate themselves from their adversaries. 
[Table 1 about here] 
III b. Theoretical Model 
The discussion above motivates our formal model of the choices governors make about 
public spending. The governor of a state maximizes votes and money. Votes include both votes 
for the governor’s own reelection as well as votes for a successor, given the existence of term 
limits in Brazil. Money is desired both for its own sake and in order to purchase votes through 
electoral campaigns. The governor’s choice variables are Eu and ER which are the amount of 
effort the governor and his staff allocate towards producing, respectively, public goods, Pu, such 
as public safety, health, and education, and private goods, Pr, that is goods that benefit specific 
small closed groups.
1 There is a limited amount of effort available to the governor,  E , so that Eu 
+ Er =  E . In addition the governor chooses how much of the resources received from private 
groups are allocated to pursue reelection (or making a successor) and how much is pocketed for 
personal  gain.  Let α be a variable that measures the share of total resource received by the 
governor  from  private  groups  and  through  corruption  (e.g.  overinvoicing)  that  are  used  for 
electoral purposes, where 0≤α≤1. 
  The governor thus chooses Eu, Er, and α so as to solve the following problem: 
)] , (( )), ( ( ) 1 ( )), ( ( ), ( ), ( ( [
, , θ α α α
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subject to                   (1) 
Eu + Er =  E and 0≤α≤1. 
  The objective function shows that the governor’s utility is affected by both votes V(⋅) and 
by the share of resources that are pocketed  )) ( ( ) 1 ( r r E P R α − . Votes are influenced by the public 
goods provided by the governor Pu and through the private goods provided to the interest groups 
Pr. In addition votes can be obtained through electoral propaganda which is purchased using the 
resources R provided by the private groups. A fraction α of the resources is used for electoral 
purposes and remaining (1- α) is appropriated by the governor. Increased resources for personal 
uses raises the Governor’s utility but also has a cost, C(α,θ). This term is the expected cost of 
being  caught  and  prosecuted  appropriating  public  funds,  capturing  both  the  legal  penalties 
involved as well as any potential electoral cost, such as loss of reputation. The cost is inversely 
proportional to the share of funds used legitimately. The parameter θ  measures the probability of 
being caught, so that C
θ>0.  The first order conditions that solve this problem are: 
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1 In order to simplify the presentation only one private group is included. This can easily be generalized to allow for 
n groups (see, for example, Denzau and Munder 1986).   5 
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Where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the restriction Eu + Er =  E . 
Equations (2) and (3) together yield the following condition: 
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This condition states that the marginal unit of effort will always be placed in that activity 
(public or private good) which yields the greatest electoral return to the governor, given α. The 
term on the left measures the gain from the marginal unit of effort on the public good, which 
comes through votes. The middle term measures the gain from the marginal unit of effort on the 
private  good.  This  comes  in  three  ways:  (i)  through  the  marginal  votes  generated  by  those 
policies  (first  part  of  this  term);  (ii)  through  the  marginal  votes  purchased  with  resources 
obtained in exchange for effort for private goods; and (iii) through the marginal resources that 
the governor pockets due to the additional effort for private goods. In equilibrium the gain in 
utility to the politician from the marginal unit of effort must be same for private and public goods 
and is equal to λ. 
Similarly, condition (4) states that the decision whether to use resources for electoral or 
for  personal  purposes  is  taken  so  that  the  marginal  real  (R$)  goes  to  that  purpose  which 
generates most utility. Thus in equilibrium, the utility from the marginal real is the same whether 
it goes to finance the governor’s campaign or his bank account. 
  Our  primary  interest  in  this  paper  is  to  analyze  how  the  equilibrium  values  of  the 
dependent variables Eu, Er, and α are affected by checks & balances and by political competition. 
Both  of  these  factors  enter  as  parameters  in  several  of  the  functions  in  equations  (2-5).  In 
appendix A we provide a brief discussion of each of these functions as they are the channels 
through  which  the  impact  of  checks  &  balances  and  political  competition  affect  governors’ 
choices over public policies. This will set the stage for the next section where we test for these 
impacts econometrically. In addition a set of controls is added to take into account the effect of 
each state’s economic and social level of development. 
Let the level of checks & balances be denoted by θ, that of political competition by π, and the 
social/economic effects as ψ. In what follows we present the comparative statistics exercise with 
the function denoting the productivity of effort in producing public goods - 
Eu
u P (Eu ,θ, π, ψ) - 
and discuss  the results for the remaining other functions in the appendix. This function measures 
the amount of additional public good that materializes when a governor allocates a marginal unit 
of effort towards Eu. We explicitly note that it is affected by both θ and π. There is no theoretical 
reason for expecting the signs of these impacts to be either positive or negative. To see this 
consider, as an example, the impact of a change that increases the level of political competition 
faced by a governor. Depending on the circumstances, this change may lead to either more or 
less public good being  produced from the marginal level of effort. Note that what is under 
consideration here is not how much effort the governor decides to dedicate to public goods but 
rather more narrowly the amount of public good that results from the marginal level of effort, 
whatever the optimal level of effort for public goods may be. Suppose for example that the 
increased level of political competition leads to a situation where the governor needs to bring 
additional  parties  into  his  coalition.  Conceivably  this  may  make  the  process  of  proposing, 
approving and implementing the legislation that generates the public good slower and more   6 
cumbersome as it requires more negotiation within the coalition. On the other hand it may be that 
the presence of these new parties in the coalition may provide more pressure for the public goods 
to be provided in a timelier and more effective manner. The point is that there is no reason to 









In  the  same  manner,  improved  checks  &  balances  may  either  improve  or  depreciate  the 
productivity of effort in producing public goods. This being the case, the net impact of π or θ on 
Eu, Er, and α will be an empirical issue, which we will test in Section 3. Similar reasoning holds 
for the impact of θ on the dependent variables (see the example below). 
 
IV.   Measuring the and Testing Impact of Checks & Balances and Political Competition 
on Public Policy 
The model presented above shows how the decisions of governors about providing public 
goods,  private  goods  or  personal  benefits  is  determined  by  parameters  related  to  checks  & 
balances, political institutions, as well as economic and social characteristics of the states. The 
discussion of the model showed the channels through which the parameters exert their effects 
and gave concrete examples of the parameters. In this section we test for the impact of the 
parameters on the choices of governors. That is, we map from institutions to the characteristics 
of public policies. We estimate reduced form equations using panel data for all 27 Brazilian 
states for the two legislatures of 1999-2002 and 2003-2006.  
Dependent Variables 
The  first  challenge  in  pursing  this  strategy  is  to  obtain  measures  of  the  dependent 
variables. We use six different measures of public goods, private goods or corruption. The most 
obvious way to capture the provision of public good is to directly measure expenditures in these 
areas. We use the expenditures in health and sanitation divided by total expenditures. However, 
public goods do not only come in the form of expenditures directly aimed at the final recipient. 
Public goods can also take the form actions that improve the functioning of government, such as 
improving the tax system or realizing important reforms. Many of these actions require upfront 
costs and yield benefits in the future, so that a politician’s choice on whether to pursue these 
actions will depend on her political horizon. We pursue a measure of public goods of this nature 
by using as a dependent variable an index of expenditure efficiency in the states developed by 
Ferreira Júnior (2006), which covers the period of 1995 to 2004. The index is a ratio of the part 
of  total  expenditure  that  is  effectively  spent  in  the  final  public  good  that  is  being  provided 
(including  debt)  divided  by  the  administrative  and  other  intermediary  costs  involved  in 
producing those services. States with a higher value of this index provide more public goods at a 
lower cost. This index also partly captures the notion of private goods, as a low value of the 
index might reflect larger chunks of the state budget going to groups such as civil servants and 
construction companies rather than to the final service itself. The rationale behind using this 
variable to capture the notion of the governors’ choice to provide public versus private goods is 
that improving the index, that is the ‘efficiency’ of public expenditure is a difficult task for a 
governor, who will or will not be willing to incur such costs depending on the level and type of 
political competition that she faces as well as on the level of institutionalization in the state. 
Governors  that  foresee  longer  expected  periods  in  office  will  be  more  inclined  to  seek 
improvements in expenditure ‘efficiency.’ Similarly, governors in states that are more highly 
institutionalized  and  have  more  checks  &  balances  –  e.g.,  independent  judiciary,  public 
prosecutors,  audit  office,  free  press,  and  vigilant  society  -  may  have  less  ability  to 
opportunistically refrain from investments in improving expenditure “efficiency.”    7 
A measure of private goods which we use as the dependent variable is the percentage of 
total expenditures that are used for civil service salaries and benefits. Doling out jobs has been a 
traditional form of patronage in Brazilian state and local politics, which only recently started to 
be  reigned  in  by  the  fiscal  responsibility  law.  The  idea  is  to  determine  whether  political 
competition and checks & balances affect governor’s decision to indulge in this practice. In 
addition, we measured the variation in civil servant expenditures from the first two years in a 
term to the second two years, so as to see if the effect of the proximity of the next election in 
increasing  this  form  of  patronage  is  also  affected  by  political  contestability  and  checks  & 
balances. 
  The  final  dependent  variable  that  emerges  from  the  model  presents  an  even  larger 
challenge to quantify, as data on corruption and illicit activity by politicians are generally not 
available.  In order to provide a measure that proxys for the amount of personal benefit the 
governors and other politicians achieve from office, we use data from the Superior Electoral 
Tribunal that requires all candidates to political office to publicly declare their wealth. The data 
is  not  without  problems  as  a  politician  can  always  lie  or  underreport  his  holdings  and  also 
because there is not data for all politicians as some fail to report and others do not run for office 
at the end of their term so that they do not need to report their wealth again. Clearly this provides 
the potential for there to be a selection bias. Note, however, that our observations are at state 
level and not at individual level. We take the average wealth variation for all state deputies. Thus 
the final variable used does not contain a selection bias. It may not be a good proxy if the number 
of deputies sampled to create each state’s observation is not representative, however there will be 
no selection bias as related to econometric estimation. In any case, we mitigate this problem by 
using the number of deputies that was used to create each state observation as a regressor in the 
panel regressions.
2 Table 2 summarizes the dependent variables we use and provides the sources. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Explanatory Variables 
  As explanatory variables we need measures of the various parameters from our model. 
We discuss in detail below our index of checks & balances. Most of the other variables capture 
different  aspects  of  political  competition  and  fragmentation  in  each  state.  We  use  both  the 
number of effective parties as well as indices of electoral competition in the state assemblies. We 
also include the number of parties in the governor’s coalition, which affects the executive’s 
ability to pass his agenda through the legislature. Ideally we would like to have measures of 
whether each governor faced divided or unified government; however such data is not available 
for most states, especially as it can change across the same legislative term, according to the 
evolution of the political cycle. In compensation we do have the margin of victory of the current 
governor in the previous election (in the first round) which provides a measure of power and 
expectation of remaining in power. In the same vein we created an variable capturing the power 
of governors by interacting dummy binary variable for those governors that won in a subsequent 
with the margin by which they won. This variable selects for those governors that had good 
expectations of remaining in power and thus allowing us to test the impact of longer decision 
horizon on policy choices. In coming “pork” from the federal level may also affect the choices of 
governors because many of the amendments involve public works contracts, they potentially 
create opportunities  for  corruption that involve  state and municipal level politicians such as 
governors,  mayors  and  deputies  (Samuels,  2002).  As  an  additional  proxy  for  political 
                                                 
2 In his study of campaign finance, Samuels (2002, p. 851) points out that the data conform to commonsensical 
expectations regarding cross-candidate, cross office, and cross-partisan differences and that such patterns could 
never emerge if the declared contributions were false.    8 
competition we have data on electoral campaign expenditures, which the candidates have to 
declare  to  the  Superior  Electoral  Courts  after  the  election.
3  The  total  spent  in  campaigns  is 
summed for the state and divided by the GDP. Presumably the more spent the tighter the race. 
The final explanatory variables are education, GDP per capita and income concentration (Gini). 
Education is used a proxy in the model for the electoral response to public and private goods. 
GDP per capita and income concentration control for a series of other variables that are related to 
the stage of development of the state and its level of income.  
Measuring Checks & Balances 
  Whereas there are several obvious and readily available variables for measuring political 
competition, it is not so easy to get a measure of checks & balances, a concept which is not even 
straightforward to define. In order to create an index of checks & balances, we collected state-
level data on seven variables. The focus is on the existence, effectiveness and independence of 
several types of agencies and organizations that have important roles in checks & balances at 
different levels of government, such as the judiciary, public prosecutors and the media. We 
transformed the measures into a single index by taking the first component of an analysis of 
principal components and subsequently normalizing to range from zero to one.
4  
  The checks & balances index is shown in Table 3 ranked from highest to lowest. Overall 
the results are intuitive and fit reasonably well with common preconceived notions of which 
states have better institution. The bottom states are all state which our prior belief expected to 
find at the end of the list and Rio Grande do Sul at the top also seems to fit. As with any index, 
any supposed abnormality might be a result of poor data, poor design or incorrect expectations. 
In any case, overall the index seems reasonable and will be used in the econometric tests both to 
estimate its direct effect on the dependent variables as well as its effect on the way political 
competition affects the dependent variables.  
Estimation Results 
  The purpose of the estimations is to analyze how political and institutional environments 
affect the characteristics of the policies that emerge from Brazilian states. The six dependent 
variables (see Table 1 above) capture choices by governors to provide private goods, public 
goods or personal gain. The two variables that represent private goods are expenditures on civil 
servant expenditures, and the variation in expenditures on civil servants the political term. The 
three variables that measure public good provision are the primary deficit, health expenditures 
and expenditure efficiency. The final variable captures corruption which proxy by the variation 
in the wealth of politician over the political term. We regress each these variables against a series 
of explanatory variables that can be classified into three subsets of variables. The first is the 
checks & balance index described in the previous section, which provides a quantitative measure 
of  the  level  of  institutional  constraints  against  opportunistic  behavior  by  the  governor.  The 
second is a set of variables that measure the level of political competition or contestability faced 
by the governor. Finally there are variables that control for general economic and social features 
of the state, namely, GDP per capita, wealth concentration and education. In addition, we control 
for  fixed  effects.  The  estimations  are  thus  reduced  forms  that  capture  the  net  effect  of  the 
parameters  of  the  model  on  the  dependent  variables,  without  the  pretence  of  estimating  a 
structural model that would include the relationship among the dependent variables. We used a 
panel of all twenty-seven Brazilian states across two periods that cover two sets of four-year 
                                                 
3 This is also a problematic variable as many do not declare, especially the losers, and there is always the potential 
for underreporting.  
4 We reduced the three variables for the judiciary and the three variables for public prosecutors to single indices by 
principal component analysis prior to principal component analysis using all seven variables in Table 4.   9 
political terms (1999-2002, 2003-2006). Estimation was done controlling for fixed effects except 
in two cases where a Lagrange multiplier test recommended random effects.  
  In Table 4 we present the estimation results for the first five dependent variables. In 
column 1 ‘civil servant expenditures as a percentage of total revenues’ was regressed against the 
three subsets of variables described above. As noted, jobs in the civil service have been a major 
form of patronage in Brazilian politics and serve as a measure of private good provision. The 
coefficient on the checks & balances index is negative and statistically reliable (5%), indicating 
that constraints from other governmental branches and agencies, such as the judiciary, public 
prosecutors, state audit offices, and the media, do constrain the historic propensity by governors 
engage in patronage politics.  A one standard deviation increase in the checks & balances index, 
with  all  other  explanatory  variables  at  their  means  (dummies  set  at  zero),  decreases  the 
percentage of expenditures on civil servants from 43.6% to 38.3% of state revenues. This is a 
large impact and indicates that the characteristic of a state’s institutional environment which we 
call checks & balances is an important determinant of a state’s public policy. 
  Of our measures of political competition, three variables were found to have statistically 
reliable  effects  on  the  expenditures  on  civil  servants.  The  first  is  the  level  of  electoral 
competition  for  the  state  assembly  (candidates  per  seat),  which  has  a  non-linear  impact, 
increasing expenditures at low levels of competition and decreasing them at levels greater than 5 
candidates per chair (the average is 4.6). This result indicates that states with high levels of 
electoral competition will, ceteris paribus, have lower public employment. Because this is a 
traditional form of patronage in Brazil, this result can be interpreted as indicating that after a 
threshold level, electoral competition has a virtuous effect. 
  The two other political competition variables with significant effects in column (1) both 
measure aspects related to the time horizon of the governors. The first is the margin of victory in 
the future election for governors who went on to run for another term. This variable captures the 
expected probability of remaining in office, as victories with high margins are generally not 
surprises but rather well anticipated in advance. This variable should vary positively with the 
time horizon of governors. The second is a dummy for lame duck governors, who are already in 
their second term and thus ineligible to run for reelection and should capture a shorter time 
horizon. Our results indicate that both variables reduce expenditures on civil servants. Governors 
who expect to remain in office for an additional four years seem to refrain from patronage hiring 
whereas lame duck governors, who have shorter horizons in office, also seem to indulge less job 
distribution. A possible explanation is that the creation of jobs yields more benefits over time, in 
the form of sustained support from the individuals, rather than in a one-shot lump sum. As such 
it is of less use to an outgoing governor who will prefer, perhaps, to pursue in-pocket resources. 
  GDP per capita and income concentration (gini coefficients) entered the regression to 
control for the level of development and socio-economic characteristics of states (education was 
not found to be statistically significant). The results show that, ceteris paribus, richer states tend 
to  have  lower  expenditures  on  civil  servants  as  a  percentage  of  revenues.  Greater  income 
concentration in states results in higher expenditures on civil servants, though the effect is non-
linear  and  reduces  as  concentration  increases.  We  control  for  other  time-invariant  state 
characteristics by fixed effects. The reported R
2 is the within-R
2 as we are performing fixed 
effects estimation.
5 The value of 0.75 indicates that our three subsets of explanatory variables 
explain a good portion of the variation in the dependent variable. 
[Table 4 about here] 
                                                 
5 The within R
2 is a measure of how much the model helps when trying to predict a new observation on one of the 
states already in our sample.   10 
  The second column in Table 4 also uses civil servant expenditures (%) as a measure of 
private goods, however, rather than using the average value over the four years in the political 
term it uses the increase in the averages of the first two to the last two years. By this regression 
we assess whether checks & balances and political competition have a varying effect depending 
on the political cycle, i.e. the  distance to the next election. The average variation in civil servant 
expenditure within the electoral cycle is small (approximately only 2%), but this masks the much 
greater variation across individual states (maximum 44.9% and minimum -46.9%). Column (2) 
in Table 4 shows that increases in checks & balances reduce the propensity to hire more civil 
servants as an election gets nearer. A one standard deviation increase in checks & balances, with 
all variables at their means (dummies set at 0), would cause the variation in civil servant over the 
electoral term to change from 0.6% to -20.3%, once again quite a significant impact.
6 
  We found that four of our political competition variables had a statistically reliable and 
large impact on the change in the percentage of the budget allocated to civil servants. Both 
higher levels of electoral competition in the state assembly and greater number of parties in the 
governor’s  coalition  constrained  hiring  as  the  election  approached.  These  results  provide 
empirical evidence that the net impact of political competition on private goods is negative, that 




r E . The regression also showed that states whose governors were from the same party 
of the President, tended to increase their hiring over the electoral term less than those from other 
parties. In addition it was found that lame duck governors tended to increase their hiring over 
their terms. Column (1) showed that lame ducks governors tended to hire fewer civil servants 
than the other governors. Column (2) shows that those civil servants that they did hire were 
predominately towards the end of the terms of governors.  That is, although they prefer to put 
less  effort  towards  providing  private  goods  in  the  form  of  government  jobs,  possibly  to 
concentrate  on  personal  benefits,  they  do  nevertheless  have  the  incentive  to  establish  a  fait 
accompli to tie the hands of the next administration by hiring more workers. Although GDP per 
capita was not found to be significant it was kept in the regression to control for economic and 
social characteristics of the states. 
  In Column (3) of Table 4 the dependent variable is the average primary deficit of the state 
in each four-year period.
7 The idea is that keeping public finances in order provides benefits to 
the citizens of a state as a whole and as such has the qualities of a public good. Furthermore, 
balanced public finances require effort from the government and have high opportunity costs, in 
the sense that a governor with a short horizon would have much to gain from incurring deficits. 
The  impact  of  checks  and  balances  on  the  deficit  is  negative,  though  convex.
8  As  seems 
reasonable, states where several different actors, such as audit offices, public prosecutors and the 
media,  can  constrain  the  executive  tend  to  have  lower  deficits  or  higher  surpluses,  ceteris 
paribus. With all explanatory variables at their means (dummies set at 0 and period set at 1999-
2002) a one standard deviation increase in the checks & balances index leads to an increase of 
the surplus from 6. % to 15.%. Once again the evidence points to a large impact of checks & 
balances on public policies. 
  Of the political competition variables we found  three of the coefficients to be statistically 
reliable and large. The first is the coefficient on electoral competition in the state elections for 
                                                 
6 Because the dependent variable is a variation, we control for the initial level of civil servant hiring in each term. As 
expected this variable is found to have a negative impact on the subsequent variation, indicating that those states that 
already have hire levels of hiring have less room for increased hiring. 
7 The higher the value the greater the deficit, so that negative values indicate surpluses.  
8 The curve for predicted primary deficit slopes negatively from 0 to 0.77 and then rises. All 54 of our observations 
are on the negative portion except for three.   11 
federal deputies. Representatives in the National Congress play an important role in defending 
the states interest at the federal level and in particular in assuring higher transfers to the state. 
Clearly the level of competition among the group of federal deputies will affect their ability and 
propensity to cooperate or compete in that task. Similarly the relationship between the governor 
and  the  deputies  should  have  important  consequences  for  the  policies  adopted.  Despite  the 
importance for cooperation it is not clear a priori what the impact of competition will be on the 
characteristics of public policies. Our results show that higher levels of competition lead to lower 
deficits. On the other hand, a larger number of parties in the governor’s coalition in the state 
assembly lead to greater deficits, possibly due to the need to appease more interests. The data 
also indicate that governors that are from the same party of the President (FHC in the first period 
and Lula in the second) tend to have less fiscal discipline. In principle, greater proximity to the 
federal government could lead to either better or worse public finances, for example through 
larger transfers or through less strict application of fiscal responsibility rules. Our results indicate 
that  the  predatory  effect  dominates.  Lastly,  the  social-economic  controls  indicate  that  richer 
states (total GDP rather than per capita GDP) and more educated states have lower primary 
deficits ceteris paribus. 
  In  the  last  column  of  Table  4  the  dependent  variable  is  health  expenditures  as  a 
percentage of total expenditures, an attempt to measure the provision of public goods in a very 
direct way. We found checks & balances to be positively related to health expenditures - at a 
10% level of statistical significance. With all variables set at their mean values (dummies set at 
zero) the level of health expenditures rises from 13.5% to 15.8% of total expenditures. This is a 
sizeable impact, though we cannot tell from this analysis whether the additional expenditures 
come at the cost of other public goods or more narrowly targeted policies. 
  Political competition is also found to have a virtuous effect on health expenditures. States 
with greater electoral competition, both at the state and federal level, as well as states with more 
effective parties in their state assemblies, have a higher proportion of their expenditures going 
towards health. Lame duck governors, on the other hand, tend to have lower spending in this 
area, as do governors who are of the same party of the President. In both of these instances the 
effect of lower competition is to reduce the level of public good. It is also found that states that 
receive more pork in the form of individual budget amendments (divided by GDP) have greater 
health expenditures, possibly because these amendments often revert directly into health related 
expenditures or, alternatively, they free up resources from other areas to be used for health. 
Finally, richer states spend a higher proportion of their total expenditures on health, though the 
effect is not statistically reliable at conventional levels. 
  In column (1) of Table 5 we present the results for a variable that captures the decision of 
the governor to seek her own benefit as opposed to that of the public as a whole or of private 
groups.
9 We refrain from calling this a corruption equation as corruption may also be a means to 
provide private and even public benefit. Because seeking personal benefit is typically illicit there 
is no data available that measures this behavior directly. As a proxy we use the increase in 
personal wealth as declared by state deputies to the Supreme Electoral Court before and after 
each four years in power. Ideally we would have liked to use data for the increase in the wealth 
of governors as the dependent variable, but there were many missing observations as governors 
who could not or did not chose to run for office after their gubernatorial term did not have to 
                                                 
9 For this set of results we estimated the model using random effects because a Hausman specification test under the 
null hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model did not reject the 
null hypothesis: column (1) - 
2
8 χ  = 9.17, p-value = 0.3282; column (2) - 
2
6 χ =4.10, p-value = 0.6636. Note that this 
test is performed without an intercept or dummies.   12 
declare their wealth. Our assumption in using state deputies is that there is a positive correlation 
between the increase in wealth of the governor and other politicians in any given state.  
Column (1) shows that the checks & balances index has a non-linear negative and increasing 
impact on wealth variation, indicating that those states with checks on behavior (as measured by 
the quality of the judiciary, public prosecutors, audit offices, media, regulatory agencies, civic 
community and the judicial watchdog) have lower levels of increases in wealth for their state 
deputies. A one standard deviation increase in checks & balances, with all variables set at their 
mean levels, reduces the average increase in the wealth of politicians from 232% to 168% over 
the four year political term. This result indicates that in states with higher rankings in the checks 
& balances index there are forces that mitigate the use of power by politicians to pursue their 
own  wealth.  Ideally  we  would  like  to  make  this  claim  for  the  specific  case  of  the  state 
Governors, but due to the lack of data on their wealth variation, we can only presume that the 
same effect holds for them. 
  Several political competition variables were found to affect the variation of politicians’ 
wealth.  The  effect  of  electoral  competition  within  the  state  assembly  has  a  negative  and 
statistically reliable (10%) effect on the wealth variation of the deputies. This index measures the 
relative number of candidates per seat, indicating a virtuous effect of political competition in 
checking opportunistic behavior. Similarly, the greater the number of parties in the governor’s 
coalition, the lower the increase in the wealth of state deputies (significant at 5%). We did not 
have  a  prediction  on  how  the  number  of  parties  in  the  coalition  would  affect  the  ability  to 
accumulate  wealth  through  kickbacks.    Having  to  attract  and  manage  a  more  fragmented 
coalition might require that the governor concede more benefits to the deputies of the coalition. 
On the other hand, if the governor has a supermajority, then having more parties in the coalition 
might allow the governor to play off one party against the other and thus have to concede fewer 
benefits. That the effect is negative provides evidence once again of a virtuous impact of political 
competition. 
Our results also indicate that the greater the number of effective parties for which the state has 
representatives  in  the  National  Congress,  the  greater  is  the  increase  in  wealth  of  the  state 
deputies. This is a case where more political competition or fragmentation leads to more personal 
benefit to politicians within the state. Our model does not predict the sign of the relationship 
between  federal  and  state  deputies;  our  result  only  suggests  that  there  is  a  robust  positive 
connection reflected in the data. In order to interpret this it would be necessary to analyze the 
relationship between the local politicians (state  deputies and mayors)  and the states’ federal 
representatives. Presumably the key to understanding this relationship is in the pork brought by 
the  federal  legislators  to  local  specific  areas  in  the  state,  which  is  crucial  for  strengthening 
popularity and reelection chances. This process is also an important source of corruption as the 
implementation of the projects involved allow for over-invoicing and kick-backs. One way to 
interpret our result is that in states where there are more parties bringing in the pork, state 
deputies are getting a larger share. 
  The  wealth  of  deputies  also  increases  more  in  states  where  governors  win  the  next 
election, and when their margin of victory is greater. We constructed this measure to capture the 
effect  on  governors  of  feeling  safer  in  office.  The  positive  and  significant  (1%)  estimated 
coefficient shows that those governors with longer-term horizons allowed greater increases in the 
personal wealth of state deputies. This result is contrary to the notion of an end game giving 
incentives for opportunistic behavior. It may be that governors that will be in power for a longer 
period are more powerful and better able to resist investigation and prosecution as they have 
privileges  and  immunities  while  in  office,  which  leads  them  to  more,  rather  than  less, 
opportunistic behavior. Finally, GDP per capita was not found to be statistically significant but   13 
was  nevertheless  maintained  to  assure  that  the  checks  &  balances  variable  is  not  simply 
capturing the effect of greater economic development. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The second column in Table 5 shows the results for the variable that measures expenditure 
efficiency. The basic idea is that improving expenditures has the characteristics of a public good 
in the sense that it benefits the population at large, as well as having investment-like qualities in 
that such efforts typically have upfront costs and deferred benefits. Because some states start off 
at a higher level of expenditure efficiency, they have less room for improvement, so we use the 
initial level of expenditure efficiency as a control: its value in 1998 for the first term and for 
2002 for the second term. The estimated coefficient for this variable is negative but not reliable 
at generally accepted confidence intervals.  
  Our results show that the index of checks & balances had a positive and significant effect 
(5%), on expenditure efficiency. A one standard deviation increase in the checks & balances 
index - with all variables set at their mean values- increases the expenditure efficiency measure 
from 16% to 43% which is a very dramatic improvement, though we note once again the caveat 
that typically checks & balances evolve slowly over time. 
  What lessons regarding the determinants of the choices by governors on the provision of 
public goods, private goods and personal benefits can be summarized from the six regressions in 
Tables 6 and 7? Our results indicate that checks and balances have a virtuous impact on the 
behavior of governors; the level of public goods increases, while private goods personal benefits 
fall.  It is important to point out that this result is not simply a spurious correlation of the checks 
& balances index with higher levels of development, as we controlled for GDP per capita in all 
the  regressions.  The  second  conclusion  is  that  political  competition  variables  are  highly 
influential in the policy choices of governors. In general the political competition variables have 
a  virtuous  effect,  increasing  the  provision  of  public  goods  and  reducing    private  goods  and 
personal  wealth.  Finally,  we  found  that  the  social  and  economic  variables,  GDP  per  capita, 
education and wealth concentration, had surprisingly little explanatory power. The results lend 
strong support to the importance of political and institutional determinants of policies. 
V.  The Interaction of Political Competition and Checks & Balances 
The model in Section 2 predicted that political competition and checks & balances are key 
determinants of the characteristics of the policymaking process and the regressions in Section 3 
provided evidence of the signs and magnitudes of those relationships. We found that political 
competition has virtuous effects in some cases but predatory effects in others.
10 In addition, the 
coefficient on the checks & balance variable was large and statistically significant in all of the 
regressions and found to always have virtuous effects.  We now turn to an investigation of the 
possible interaction between political competition and checks & balances. Our model allows for 
the possibility that checks & balances works indirectly by affecting the way political competition 
impacts  policy  choices.  For  example,  the  impact  of  a  political  competition  variable  may  be 
stronger or weaker if checks & balances are more highly developed. In principle both of these 
dimensions can reinforce each other or work in opposite directions. Here we sort out whether 
such an interaction exists and if so what form it takes. 
                                                 
10 We adopt the graphical method for analyzing multiplicative interaction terms proposed by  Brambor, Clark and 
Golder (2006). It displays all the information from the interaction of the variables, including the information needed 
for inferences. 
10  Given  the  size  of  the  sample  a  separate  regression  was  run  for  each  multiplicative  term,  resulting  in  36 
regressions.   14 
  The  strategy  that  we  pursue  is  to  add  interactive  checks  and  balances/political 
competition variables to the prior regressions. That is, we can quantify and draw inferences from 
the varying effect of political competition on policy characteristics as the level of checks & 
balances changes. This will allow us to determine, for example, whether the effect of political 
competition on politicians’ wealth variation gets more or less restrictive as we move form states 
with  lower  to  higher  levels  of  checks  &  balances.  If  we  find  that  the  effect  of  political 
competition gets stronger (that is, larger in absolute terms) in more institutionalized states, then 
we can conclude that political competition and checks & balances are complements. If the effect 
of political competition gets smaller or even becomes statistically equal to zero, then we can 
conclude that both of these dimensions are substitutes.
11 
  We re-estimated each of the six regressions in Tables 6 and 7 including a multiplicative 
interaction term between the checks & balances index and each of the following six political 
competition variables: i) electoral competition in the State Assembly; ii) electoral competition in 
the House of Representatives; iii) number of parties in the governor’s coalition; iv) margin of 
victory in the last election; v) lame duck governor; and vi) governor in the President’s party.
12 
Before presenting the aggregate results it is useful to examine some of the individual results so as 
to understand in the investigative technique. We will focus on whether the political competition 
variables have virtuous or predatory effects, and whether the interaction with checks & balances 
is a substitute or complement.  
  Graph 1 shows the result from the interaction of checks & balances with the number of 
parties in the governor’s coalition when the dependent variable is the increase in wealth of state 
deputies. The slope of the line is the estimated coefficient for each level of checks & balances. 
The dashed lines are the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval throughout the 
range  of  checks  &  balances.  Whenever  this  interval  contains  the  value  zero,  the  estimated 
coefficient for that level of checks & balances can be considered to be statistically equal to zero. 
Note  that  for  low  levels  of  checks  &  balances  the  estimated  coefficient  is  negative  and 
statistically reliable, so that more parties in the coalition have the effect of reducing increases in 
the wealth of deputies over the political term. This is simply the result obtained in the previous 
section and it ascribes a virtuous effect to this type of political competition. Here the added value 
of the interactive effect is that we can see how the impact of coalition size varies as checks &  
balances varies. As checks and balances increase, the estimated coefficient becomes smaller 
(closer to zero). For values of checks and balances 0.39, the coefficient becomes statistically 
equal to zero indicating that for those points the political competition variable no longer affects 
the wealth of deputies. As shown in Table 3, 16 states in the 1999-2002 period and 15 in the 
2003-2006 period are in the range below 0.39 where the coefficient is statistically significant. 
Because the number of parties in the coalition only affects the dependent variable in states with 
low checks & balances, the presumption is then that these dimensions are substitutes. When 
states have well functioning checks & balances against opportunistic behavior by politicians, 
political competition is unnecessary.  
[Graph 1 about here] 
  The varying impact of the political competition variables as well as the differing nature of 
their interaction with checks & balances, might seem disturbing to some readers, who would 
prefer a single overarching result ascribing the same impact and interaction across dependent 
                                                 
11 We adopt the graphical method for analyzing multiplicative interaction terms proposed by  Brambor, Clark and 
Golder (2006). It displays all the information from the interaction of the variables, including the information needed 
for inferences. 
12  Given  the  size  of  the  sample  a  separate  regression  was  run  for  each  multiplicative  term,  resulting  in  36 
regressions.   15 
variables, such as we found for checks & balances. However, our results for political competition 
simply  reflects  the  fact  that  the  different  variables  measure  different  aspects  of  political 
competition. Political competition encompasses several different attributes which are present in 
varying degrees in each of the variables we used. Some attributes capture issues related to the 
governor’s time horizon, such as those predominant in the lame duck variable and the margin of 
victory  in  the  last  election.  Other  attributes  capture  issues  related  to  contestability  and  the 
existence of more or less veto players, such as the electoral competition variables. Yet another 
attribute that may permeate the political competition variables involves the issue of transaction 
costs in realizing political exchanges, as in the variable that measures the number of parties in 
the governor’s coalition. Each of these attributes permeates, to a greater or lesser degree, each of 
the  political  competition  variables,  so  that  greater  levels  of  political  competition  may  have 
different effects on the dependent variable depending on which variable is involved. To see this, 
compare the expected impact of the lame duck variable and the variable measuring the margin of 
victory in the last election. Both a lame duck governor and one that has won the last election by 
an overwhelming majority are in a position of reduced competition, as the first cannot run for 
reelection and the second supposedly has a head start to win the next election. Nevertheless, the 
impact of this reduced competition can reasonably work in opposite directions. Whereas the lame 
duck governor has a short horizon and fewer electoral incentive to pursue good policies, the 
other has a longer horizon and may find it in her interest to pursue good policies. Our results are 
consistent with these expectations. The margin of victory variable was found to have a virtuous 
effect in two instances and the lame duck variable to have a predatory effect in two cases and a 
virtuous effect in one. The fact that different political competition variables can have different 
effects and interactions simply reflects the variety of incentives contained in different variables. 
If,  however,  one  had  to  classify  each  of  the  political  competition  variables  as  virtuous  or 
predatory, then the conclusion would be that political competition is overwhelmingly virtuous, as 
five of the six variables had predominantly virtuous impacts on the public policy variables. Only 
the margin of victory in the last election implies that more competition leads to more predatory 
public policies.  In all other cases political competition is more often than not virtuous. 
VI -Conclusions 
We modeled and tested the determinants of public polices at the state level in Brazil, in 
particular the decision by governors, to pursue public goods, private goods or their own personal 
wealth. Our overall finding is that checks & balances and political competition are the major 
determinants  of  the  policy  decisions  of  governors.  Our  empirical  results  show  that  better 
developed checks & balances have a strong impact on the choices of governors to increase public 
goods and restrict the provision of private goods and the pursuit of personal benefits. The results 
for political competition are not as clear cut, as different variables used to measure competition 
capture  different  attributes  of  the  incentives  faced  by  governors.  Nevertheless,  the  evidence 
points to an predominance of a virtuous impact of political competition on policy choice. 
In  addition  to  the  direct  effects  of  checks  &  balances  and  political  competition,  we 
analyzed whether there existed an interaction of these factors impacting the choices of governors. 
We analyzed whether the impact of political competition on the characteristics of the policies in 
a  state  is  affected  by  level  of  checks  &  balances.  Here  the  evidence  was  divided  with 
approximately equal number of instances in which checks & balances augmented or mitigated 
the  effect  of  political  competition.  Given  that  political  competition  was  found  to  have  an 
overwhelmingly virtuous effect, this means that greater levels of checks & balances are generally 
more desirable, as it will either amplify those effects, when the interaction is complementary, or 
act as a replacement when the interaction is a substitute.   16 
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Table 1: Contestability versus Checks & Balances 
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may produce policy volatility 
if preferences are polarized. 
Ex. Rio Grande do Sul 
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Incentives 
Ex. Minas Gerais 
 
Table 2 – Dependent Variables 
Num.  Name  Description  Source 
1  Expenditure 
efficiency variation 
The  increase  during  the  4  year  term  of  an  index  of 
expenditure  efficiency  that  measures  the  ratio  of  final 
expenditures  to  ‘input’  or  ‘means’  expenditures  (e.g. 
administrative  costs).  Data  for  1999-2002  and  2003-
2004. 
Ferreira Júnior, S. (2006). 
2 
Wealth  variation- 
state  assembly 
deputies. 
Percent  variation  of  state  assembly  deputies’  declared 
wealth. Average for all deputies in the state for which 
there is information. Data for 1999-2002 and 2003-2006. 
Rodrigues (2006) Políticos do 
Brasil. 
3  Civil  servant 
expenditures 
Total expenditure with civil servants (salaries + benefits) 
as  percent  of  total  revenues  in  the  state.  (Average  for 
1999-2002 and 2003-2005) 
IPEADATA. 
4 
Variation  of 
expenditure  on  civil 
servants 
The increase in expenditures on civil servants (%) from 
the average of the first two years in the electoral term to 
the second two years.  
IPEADATA. 
5  Primary Deficit  The  difference  between  non-financial  expenditures  and 
non-financial revenues, divided by total revenues.  Ferreira Júnior, S. (2006) 
7 
Health&  sanitation 
expenditures 
Total health and sanitation expenditures divided by total 
expenditures. 
(average for 1999-2002 and 2003-2005) 
IPEADATA.   18 
Table 3 – Checks & balances Index. 
Num  State  C&B Index 
1999-2002  Num  State  C&B Index 
2003-2006 
1  Rio Grande do Sul  0.813  1  Rio Grande do Sul  1.000 
2  Distrito Federal  0.775  2  Rio de Janeiro  0.728 
3  Rio de Janeiro  0.684  3  São Paulo  0.684 
4  Mato Grosso do Sul  0.619  4  Distrito Federal  0.671 
5  São Paulo  0.569  5  Mato Grosso do Sul  0.585 
6  Santa Catarina  0.555  6  Santa Catarina  0.545 
7  Espírito Santo  0.530  7  Minas Gerais  0.519 
8  Pernambuco  0.509  8  Espírito Santo  0.506 
9  Rondônia  0.501  9  Pernambuco  0.483 
10  Minas Gerais  0.426  10  Bahia  0.454 
11  Bahia  0.414  11  Paraná  0.402 
12  Mato Grosso  0.390  12  Goiás  0.400 
13  Sergipe  0.389  13  Mato Grosso  0.377 
14  Goiás  0.387  14  Sergipe  0.345 
15  Paraná  0.378  15  Rondônia  0.318 
16  Amazonas  0.299  16  Amazonas  0.315 
17  Amapá  0.271  17  Ceará  0.258 
18  Ceará  0.248  18  Amapá  0.247 
19  Pará  0.227  19  Pará  0.242 
20  Paraíba  0.207  20  Alagoas  0.183 
21  Acre  0.198  21  Paraíba  0.161 
22  Tocantins  0.189  22  Tocantins  0.159 
23  Alagoas  0.186  23  Acre  0.146 
24  Piauí  0.088  24  Piauí  0.059 
25  Rio Grande do Norte  0.032  25  Roraima  0.049 
26  Roraima  0.023  26  Maranhão  0.043 
27  Maranhão  0.000  27  Rio Grande do Norte  0.029 
  Mean  0.367    Mean  0.367 
  Std. Dev.  0.222    Std. Dev.  0.240 
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Table 4 – Determinants of Governors’ Choices  




Variation of Civil 








(% of GDP) 














Checks & Balances 
Index squared 




Initial level of Civil Servant Expend. (%)    -7.352
*** 
(-3.24) 
   









Electoral competition in the State 




     
Electoral competition 










Effective number of parties in State Assembly        0.003
* 
(2.09) 









Margin of victory in last election (Gov.)  -0.004 
(-0.73) 
    0.004 
(1.44) 
Expected Margin of victory in next election  -0.016
*** 
(-2.93) 
     


















Pork (%gdp/1000)        0.0002
*** 
(3.74) 
Gini coefficient of wealth concentration  8.693
* 
(1.75) 
     
Gini squared  -7.984
* 
(-1.79) 
     





  0.0.13 
(1.45) 









Period      4.063 
(1.54) 
 












Method  Fixed Effects. 
2 periods, 27 states 
Fixed Effects. 
2 periods, 27 
states 
Fixed Effects. 




2 periods, 27 
states 








Observations  54  54  54  54 
R-squared (within)  0.75  0.51  0.63  0.85 
Notes: In parentheses, t-stats. 
*** indicates significant at 1%, 
** at 5%, and 
* at 10%.   20 
Table 5 – Determinants of Politicians Wealth Variation and Expenditure Efficiency 




















Initial level of Expenditure Efficiency    -0.084 
(-1.27) 
Initial level of Wealth  0.0000 
(0.66) 
 























Governor in President’s Party    -0.160 
(-0.95) 
Gini    3.505
 
(1.35) 













Method  Random Effects - 
2 periods, 27 states 
Random Effects 
2 periods, 27 states 




Observations  54  54 
Hausman test for random  vs. fixed effects  χ
2(8)= 9.17 
p-value = 0.3282 
χ
2(6)= 4.10 
p-value = 0.6636 
R-squared  R-sq: within = 0.4610 
between = 0.2718 
overall = 0.3546 
R-sq: within = 
0.2310 
between = 0.3421 
overall = 0.2803 
   Notes: In parentheses, t-stats. 
*** indicates significant at 1%, 
** at 5% and  
* at 10%. 
 